Violence, Peace, Self and Others: A Philosophical Perspective

- By Saral Jhingran

Abstract

So far peace has been conceived and discussed in the context of war in Western thought. But peace can be both a state of mind, as well as a state of society, so that every kind of violence, from world war to terrorism, inter-community strife, as well as every day conflicts between neighbours and even within a family, is opposed to peace and harmony. The biggest source of violence is man's ego, the sense of selfhood pitted against all other selves. One's self or ego depends upon its level of identification, first with one's family, and later on with one's community, howsoever that community may be defined. The remedy lies in perceiving and emphasizing our commonalities, affinity to each other, as well as our interdependence.

I

1. Violence as the Negation of Peace

Somehow war and peace are paired in our thinking as night and day. So, whenever we talk of peace, it is invariably in the context of international violence. Often, peace efforts are defended in the context of nuclear war, or nuclear weapons, as if any violence other than one at a global stage is not important. However, the scale of violence alone cannot be the criterion, though it may still be important, for judging the desirability or otherwise of violence or peace. Of course, wars fought on a big scale not only cause death and suffering to millions but also result in the destruction of normal life for a long time after that. Cruelty perpetrated during wars dehumanizes the warring parties. But we need not confine our understanding of violence to large scale wars.

Violence of every kind is the greatest challenge to peace. Simply said, violence is the counterpoise of peace. Violence can be of different forms, intensity and extension. It can be the violence perpetrated in wars, involving maximum deaths and destruction, as also inhuman cruelty. It can be violence expressed in acts of terrorism, which again can be different in their motivation, extension, and the cruelty involved. Equally significant is the violence that is perpetrated by the hooligans upsetting community life. Violence during the partition of India resulted in the death and displacement of millions, which they say was equal to a world war. Since independence, we have seen considerable violence in India, some verging on genocide of the targeted community. I personally feel that violence practiced in inter­community riots is more cruel and reprehensible than even the violence and death as a result of terrorist acts. It is so because in rioting the predators stand and watch the intense suffering of their victims whom they are murdering or burning alive. Not only in India, but in most Arab or Islamic countries, from Afghanistan, Iraq to Sudan and Morocco, intercommunity violence which spares no one and involves acts of inhuman ferocity has become a commonplace. However, the counter measures against terrorism taken by the Western powers led by the U.S., through bombing and destroying the entire populace, is as inhuman as the terrorism they aim at restraining.

2. Violence and the Perception of the "Other" as an Alien

In order to understand peace and try to realize it, we must first understand the nature and causes of violence. Peace, though a very positive state of mind and society, would naturally ensue when causes of conflict and violence are eliminated. The biggest challenge to peace comes from the human tendency of looking at others with suspicion and hatred. Or rather, the final source and basis of violence in society or in the world is the human ego, the sense of one's own self as the most important thing in the world, pitted against all others. Existentialist thinkers, such as Martin Heidegger, stress first that the self defines itself only in relation to other selves, and being related to other selves is an essential aspect, or even constitutive of the self, and second, they also contend that the one can never have real contact with the other selves.¹ J.P. Sartre emphasized the essential solitariness of the individual, and that the other selves are a challenge for the very being of my self.² We need not agree with their version of the nature of self and its necessary conflict with others. But it is a matter of every day experience that most people act in a way that would further the interests of their own selves.

Philosophers have admitted that there is nothing irrational in acting according to considerations of expedient self-interest.³ But this natural tendency of human beings is different from the often aggressive assertion of self which rejects interests of all others as irrelevant. We may not be conscious of this, but most of us do feel and act in that way.

The boundaries of the self are extended from the beginning to include family members, or those whom we love or care for. Most of the time, this sense of selfhood is further extended to include either one's friends or those who share one's thoughts and ideology. Finally, one often identifies oneself with one's community, though the conception of community being so varied that the emotional attachment with it may be more or less, which would determine whether it may be included in the understanding of the self of itself.

In the West, the idea of the community is given great prominence, but their understanding of the very idea and criterion of community is so varied that perhaps no real inclusion of it in the idea of self occurs. On the other hand, in India, religious community and caste become the basis of one's identification with all the people belonging to one's religion or caste. (It is another matter that when it is a question of pursuing self-interest, understood in the narrower sense, all other considerations are forgotten.). Some of the existentialists asserted that nation is the final basis of not only one's community but also of one's selfhood. But such a distorted point of view can have dangerous results. Heidegger later supported Fascist regime and Sartre became a fanatic communist.

Bernard Gert has rightly contended that nationalism is one of the two biggest sources of violence and war, which is true. But he cites religion as an equally strong basis of creating conflict and violence.⁴ believe that there is need for distinguishing between the core or basic faith of a given religion, and its peripheral matters.⁵ John Hick has forcefully argued that religion as such, or the fundamental faith and creed of religion, does not preach violence; but when it develops and is interpreted under changed historical circumstances, it may lead to conflict and violence.⁶ For example, even if it is noted that Islam is fully anti-violence, the way the contemporary Islamic terrorists are going about killing innocent people goes against many injunctions of the Quran. And those Hindu fanatics who indulge in violence and rioting against the minorities and project Hinduism as an aggressive religion go against every possible tenet of Hinduism.

Inter-religious community conflicts are called "communalism" in India, though in the West community fellow feeling is given a positive connotation. I have argued elsewhere that the very division of the populace into majority and minority falsifies everyday reality. Conflict between any two communities based merely on their religious faith falsifies the lived reality in which members of the two communities share innumerable secular interests and even identities.⁷ Now, caste has become an equally strong criterion for dividing the populace into innumerable communities.

Whatever the basis of our conceptualization of community, there are two necessary ingredients of it— first, all people who are supposed to belong to that community are understood to have homogeneous nature, culture, and secular interests; and second, these secular interests are declared to be necessarily against those of other communities; or rather, their interests are understood to be necessarily contradictory to those of one's community.⁸ This fallacious reading of the ground reality leads to mutual distrust, hostility, and conflict, and finally violence, thus disrupting the peace of the country. It is motivated by an equally fallacious sense of identity, whether of the individual or that of the so-called community.

The same happens in the case of international conflicts. It is presumed that other nations and their interests are in some basic sense different from and contradictory to those of one's nation. Alternatively, a people's ego or sense of identity becomes so strong, that they as a nation start thinking that they belong to some superior race or level. Thus Hitler's and his followers' megalomania of belonging to some superior Aryan race led both to the genocide of millions of Jews and to the Second World War resulting in unprecedented death of millions and destruction all round.

Now the U.S. thinks and acts in the same way. Its sense of identity has grown so strong and megalomaniac that it considers itself the guardian of the whole world. Also it considers its own world view and values as paradigmatic and expects all other nations to follow them. Finally it constantly asserts its status as the most powerful nation in the world to whom all others must owe alliance. The U.S. (and to a lesser extent other Western countries) also suffers from Islam phobia, and so it is ready to attack and destroy any people whom it considers as going not only against its interests but also against its values and norms. This megalomania of one nation has resulted in several wars and unthinkable misery of millions of people in Vietnam, Afghanistan, and Iraq.

Post-modern cultural relativism has emphasized the disparity of cultures and languages, so much that a person belonging to one culture and speaking one language is not supposed to even understand what the other is trying to say! They talk of the integrity of every culture which seems to make the whole culture and its people like the "monads" of Leibniz.⁹ It is not that the nations or groups fighting with each other are inspired by their philosophy; nor is their philosophy right or true to historical facts. And yet we or our political leaders do exaggerate differences in cultures, or conflict in the interests of different cultures or nations.

One other source of violence is the fundamentalism of certain religions. Interestingly, this fundamentalism is directed not against the "other" but towards their own people. Earlier Catholic church practised this fundamentalism, forcing its own people to act against all their natural instincts and interests. Islamic fundamentalism, largely aimed at women, was always there, but in contemporary context feels all the more stark and violent. In Hinduism, the injunctions and prohibitions of the Dharmashastras were equally prone to be cruel or violent; but Hindus have gradually succeeded in shaking off those restricting injunctions in secular matters, though other religious dogmas and practices are followed enthusiastically. Probably, fundamentalism originates in the urge for power on the part of Christian and Islamic clergy, as well as the Brahmins of Hinduism, who shamelessly appropriated the status of being similar to Gods for themselves. Any kind of fundamentalism which forces its injunctions and prohibitions with cruelest possible sanctions and threats of punishments for their transgression is an equal source of violence.

Fanaticism is an extreme version of fundamentalism, and when combined with communalism in the Indian sense results in worse type of intercommunity violence. Probably it also originates in some people's urge for power over others, whether belonging to other religion or their own. Sometimes fanatics' urge for power results in extreme violence against their own people, as is happening in Islamic countries all over the world, or even in India. Whether it is the violence perpetrated by Islamic groups against rival sects, or it is violence in the name of some false ideology, as in the Naxalite violence against equally poor innocent policemen, or any one else whom they suspect to be against them, they are all equally evil and violate prospects of peace.

One thing more. Generally, if we talk of violence, we talk of either violence in wars, or in the contemporary world, violence of terrorism. But the violence that is perpetrated against other groups of the same society, as in Sudan, Afghanistan, Pakistan, Iraq and India, in the form of rioting, killing, burning alive of one's neighbours, is far more cruel, as the perpetrators of violence enjoy the intense suffering of their victims. This kind of violence must turn its perpetrators into inhuman satanic beings. When they later mingle in society, they must inspire and infuse their brutality in others, thus transforming the largely peaceful people into aggressive hateful and violent lot. This results in the general increase of violence in the whole society. There cannot be a worst source of permanent destruction of peace and harmony in society.

Whether it is a group which perceives other groups, identified on the basis of either religion, or caste, or region, as a challenge to their secular growth, or it is a nation which regards the development or different culture of other nations as a challenge to its culture and power, leading to hostility and violence among groups and nations, its basis is always the perception of the other group or nation as the "other," an alien with whom no meaningful dialogue is possible, only way being that of strife and war.

Nowadays we are confronted by a new kind of violence — violence against women. Cruelty and inhumanity involved in the rape and subsequent murder of women and small girls, often 4 to 6 years old, is so inhuman and demonic that our souls shudder even to think of that. What is the source of such Satanic violence? Recently we are faced, especially in North India, a new kind of violence, popularly called 'road rage’. This is expressed in burgeoning to death the "offending party," even if the victim's crime may be scratching the car of the predator. Possibly, the perpetrators of such crimes do not see their victims as some one like themselves; or it is some fiendish desire for power over their victims. However, the disproportion and inhuman cruelty of this new kind of violence is impossible to understand.

II

The Nature and Sources of Peace

There are two main ways to counter violence and ensure peace. As violence is the greatest obstruction to peace, in Indian thought the most fundamental value is ahimsa or non-violence. Non-violence is conceived as a comprehensive virtue; it includes not hurting others by bodily action, speech and even thought (as hatred, envy etc.). The values of ahimsa and peace (shanti) lie in an attitude of total goodwill towards others, whether friend or enemy. The idea of ahimsa can become the basis of a philosophy of universal compassion, as in Buddhism. In fact, the values of ahimsa, friendliness and universal compassion are extolled in the texts of every Indian religion and philosophy.¹⁰

The creed of non-violence is inspired by a conscious or subconscious recognition of similarity and affinity between human beings. This is the second requirement of peace — that of recognizing similarities between different groups and nations for the simple reason that the people belonging to different cultures are all human beings. And human beings live, die and suffer, as well as enjoy the things of life in very similar ways.

Vedanta has declared that finally all beings, everything in the universe have their source and ground in one Absolute; rather every being and every thing is the same as the Absolute (Atman-Brahman ). If so, there should remain no basis for differentiation between oneself and others, far less any basis of violence against others. Unfortunately, Brahmanic Hinduism failed to translate this vision in real life, and neither condemned violence, nor the division of human beings on the basis of hierarchical varnas.

Though Indians failed to realize in practice their idealistic philosophy of fundamental unity of all living beings; still there was a general repeated assertion of equality of all human beings, the value of impartiality and friendliness towards all. The Bhagvadgita advises without reference to any religious belief that "we must understand all human beings on the analogy of oneself, that is akin to oneself (atmopamyena sarvatra..)."¹¹ The real idea is that if we consider other human beings like ourselves, there would remain no basis for enmity and conflict between man and man.

However, it was only later in middle ages that the infusion of theistic devotional (Bhakti) cult transformed Hinduism. Most bhakta saints asserted that all human beings are equal before God. Kabir went one step further and rejected all man-made differences. He told his contemporary Hindus who practised caste differences, that if Brahmins are a superior race, how is it that they are born in a similar manner to other humans, and not in another unique manner. He also rejected religious-ritualistic distinctions as irrelevant, and told the maulvis that if circumcision is a sign of being a Muslim, why were all Muslims not born circumcised?¹² The idea was that all human beings are absolutely equal and akin to each other. They are born, live and die in the same way. And, therefore, declared Kabir, 'since all beings are born of one Nur (Glory), or one Jyoti (Divine Light), we cannot differentiate between Hindus and Turks, Brahmins and Shudras (extreme lower caste), or even between good and bad.¹³. If so there remains no reason for declaring any one's superiority over others, far less for killing each other. Kabir passionately condemned all inter­community killings, as also killing of animals in the name of religion.¹⁴ His single minded message was that basically all living beings (and not only human beings) are made of the same stuff — blood, meat, sperm, etc.¹⁵ It is significant that even though Kabir was an intensely religious person, most of his diatribe against man-made distinctions is based on empirical or secular arguments. The central idea of Kabir is the fundamental affinity of all living beings, which awareness leaves no scope for mutual hatred or violence.

Buddhism, as well as Jainism which was older, emphasized non­violence as the most basic virtue. Both denied a creator God, while Buddhism also denied the soul. Later Mahayana Buddhism developed the idea that if there are no souls, then there is no basis for the distinction between oneself and another; and no basis for pursuing the interests of some one person at the cost of others.¹⁶ Inasmuch as it is the ego or pursuit of one's interests at the cost of others which is the cause of all conflicts between humans, this leaves no scope for violence and conflict. Buddhism has given karuna (compassion) a central place in its ethics and even world-view. It inspired king Ashoka to eschew all violence and war and spread the message of peace.

Christ not only proclaimed equality of all human beings, but also gave the message of love of all, as they are children of the same Father.¹⁷ But under the influence of Judaic fanaticism he often made drastic distinction between the "chosen" of the Father and those who are condemned to hell.¹⁸ St. Augustine reiterated this distinction; and middle ages saw large-scale violence and persecution in the name of religion.

Unfortunately, we tend to see differences more, and the underlying affinities less. It is only the discerning soul who is able to see the basic affinity between human beings. It can be objected that we cannot realize peace in the secular multi-cultural world by referring to the varied teachings of religion which sometimes even lend themselves to the cause of violence.¹⁹ In response, we can refer first, to human experience of natural empathy for other human beings, and second, to the views of various philosophers.

Several modern philosophers have acknowledged that not hurting others is the most fundamental value, or duty of humankind. However, the real help for peace comes from a genuine awareness of the affinity between all human beings. Thus, David Hume declared in 17th century that there is a fundamental similarity between all human beings. Moreover, all have the sentiment of sympathy in their bosoms which makes them empathize with the suffering of other human beings; and approve all moral actions which aim at relieving that suffering.²⁰ It is true that most humans are capable of sympathy, but this sentiment often remains clouded by one's egoism making normal persons act in a way which will harm the interests of others.

Immanuel Kant is regarded as not only an uncompromising rationalist but also as an absolutist in ethics who denied any role to human emotions. But the same Kant has advocated not only the equality and dignity of all humans due to their essential rationality and humanity, equal claimants of respect from others — which leaves no scope for privileges or using others as means of our self interests, which is the main cause of all strife and violence in the world.²¹ He also emphasizes our duty to do as much as we can to help other human beings. He goes one step further and contends that someone doing good to another must not think or show that she has done something great, as by helping others we are only restoring the injustice of the society which has reduced those people to a deprived state.²² To quote him:

"The maxim of common interest, of beneficence towards those in need is a universal duty of people, just because they are to be considered fellow humans, that is rational beings with needs, united by nature in one dwelling place, so that they can help one another."²³

The fundamental need for peace both at micro and macro levels is this recognition of basic similarity between man and man. Politicians and even common men are ever ready to cry out war against some perceived enemy. But sitting secure and comfortable in their offices and homes, they have no idea how much suffering the soldiers fighting the politicians' war have to undergo. And of course they refuse to understand that the soldiers and people of the "enemy" country suffer as much as ours do. There is no difference between a wounded soldier lying unaided somewhere, whether he belongs to this country or another. His suffering, and the suffering of his dear ones if he does not return are exactly the same as the sufferings on our side. Modern wars, practiced by the U.S. are still worse, as the perpetrators of violence do not suffer, sometimes do not even see what sufferings they have unleashed by dropping bombs on whom they consider their enemy and the neighbouring population of innocent civilians.

All this violence and war is caused by the failure of the perpetrators of violence to recognize that after all the victims of their violence are human beings similar to them, both in their suffering and their simple desires for life. This affinity between human beings and the absolute equality between them is the foundation of the Golden Rule, especially in its negative form: "Do not do to others what you would not like to be done to you by others." The Golden Rule, in both its negative and positive forms, is found in all world religions.²⁴ More important, various ethicists, having argued their way for justifying a way of moral duty, finally end up endorsing the Golden Rule. Henry Sidgwick has famously declared: "It cannot be right for A to treat B in a manner in which it would be wrong for B to treat A.."²⁵ The basic idea is that the powerful and clever people and nations cannot be accepted as riding over the interests of others simply because they think themselves as supreme, whose interests override the interests of all others.

Philosophers have talked of universalizability which is a necessity of all rational thinking. So, we cannot demand special rights for ourselves which we deny to others in similar circumstances. R. M. Hare, has argued that a person who is being unjust and cruel to another person must be asked to imagine himself in the position of the victim of his actions, and then tell how he would feel if he was treated in the way he is treating the other person. He contends that this argument should be sufficient for the agent to desist from whatever he is contemplating against the other.²⁶ Putting oneself in another's place is the mantra of peace and harmony. Hare goes on to argue that it is logically demanded that if a person or a group thinks that he/ they have a right for a particular privilege, or a course of action which would harm the interests of others, then they are contradicting themselves if he/they refuse that others are entitled to treat them in a similar way.²⁷ Hare refers to the utilitarian principle that each person is to be counted as one and no one should be more than one. He goes on to contend that the interests of all persons must be considered equally.²⁸ But why this should be so is not clear in Hare's account.

Sidgwick had earlier declared that the interests of all human beings are same from the point of view of the universe.²⁹ Sidgwick was a utilitarian who believed in the equal value of all individuals, and an intuitionist. He said:

'I find that 1 undoubtedly seem to perceive, as clearly and certainly as 1 see an axiom in arithmetic or geometry, that it is "right " and "reasonable" for me to treat others as I think that I myself ought to be treated under similar conditions, and to do what I believe to be ultimately conducive to the universal Good or happiness.'³⁰

Other Western philosophers have equally stressed the fact that basically all humans are similar in their needs, goals, emotional responses to various life situations, etc.

We can tell the perpetrator of violence, whether they are the politicians and generals of some powerful nations like America; or are terrorists of any and every hue — that the victims of your violence are just like you; and if you imagine yourself in their place, you would feel that you would not like to suffer as your actions are making them suffer. (There can be some fanatic terrorists who would not be moved by this argument. They are permanent threats to peace. We cannot do anything about them.).

There are many other thinkers who have used the fact of affinity between human beings as the basis for justifying moral duty. W. T. Stace points out that we exaggerate differences, whereas human nature is basically the same everywhere. Man's fundamental needs - physical, mental and moral — are the same everywhere.³¹ Hence, the Golden Rule expresses the essence of morality, as well as we may add, the essential path to peace.

We can derive the maxim of toleration from the Golden Rule, toleration in every field of life — from religious to social, cultural, and international relations. Mahatma Gandhi gave the twin messages of universal toleration and ahimsa. Intolerance of others' ways breeds violence. Therefore, the remedy of violence is toleration and ahimsa. And ahimsa “requires a large heart, otherwise called charity. Let us do unto others as we would that they should do unto us."³² Gandhi cautioned that "Toleration is not a coinciding of views. There should be toleration of one another's views, though they may be poles apart..."³³ Mahatma mostly spoke in the context of religious conflicts, and repeatedly declared that "Truth is the exclusive property of no one." We can apply this principle in the context of Westerners' intolerance of other cultures and mores. Same could be said of the intolerance and hatred of various Muslim fanatic groups killing each other, often in the name of religion.

We can call this approach of tolerance as a liberal approach to life and its various conflicts. Finally, justice is the most important value. The value of justice has been recognized better in Western cultures than in Asian ones, perhaps because of the restraining influence of cultural norms in the latter. From Socrates to John Rawls, justice has been emphasized and elaborated as a means of social harmony in the West. For want of space we would leave out earlier concepts of justice and only refer to Rawls.' As is well known, Rawls understood justice as equality of, or equal opportunity for, all human beings in a socio­political structure in which the interests of the most under-privileged are taken care of.³⁴ And when masses are deprived of this justice, there results a disruption of peace. The latter may not be a violence of the type of war or even fanaticism inspired terrorism, but it does result in violence, as in the Naxalite violence in India.

Equality, justice, toleration and ahimsa are more or less equivalent. This requires that the powerful and the privileged must not make others means of realization of their ends. This also means toleration of others' views and ways; as also ahimsa. The latter means not only not hurting others but also an attitude of perfect goodwill towards others, which forbids violent interference with the ways of others, though it may not include doing good to others. It is so because the urge for doing good often leads to aggression and even destruction of others' lives and culture.

Japan developed a beautiful philosophy of Kyosei which unfortunately did not remain popular later. The philosophy of Kyosei is based on the Buddhist doctrine of "pratityasamutpada" that is interdependence of all beings and nature in life. And its protagonist Shiio Benkyo, contended that there would be peace and well-being all around, if human beings realize in practice that they depend on each other and on nature. It is the sense of separate, independent identities, seen in necessary conflict with each other that results in all conflicts and disruption of all chances of peace. The only way to peace is through the realization of the basic similarity, affinity of all human beings and their necessary interdependence.

Notes and References

1. Heidegger, quoted in Jurgen Habermas, in Philosophical Discourse of Modernity, (Tr., Frederick Lawrence) (Cambridge, Massachusetts: The M.I.T. Press, 1995), pp. 131 ff.
2. Sartre, " Existentialism is a Humanism," as given in Approaches to Ethics, ed. by W.T. Jones, J.F. Sontag, et al. (New York: MacGraw Hill Co., 1962), pp. 251 ff.
3. See Kurt Baier, The Moral Point of Viezv :A Rational Basis of Ethics (New York: Random House, 1967), pp. 51 ff.
4. See Bernard Gert, Morality: Its Nature and justification (New York: Oxford University Press, 2005), pp. 307, 317.
5. See Saral Jhingran, Secularism in India (New Delhi: Har-Anand Publications, 1995), pp. 74 ff.
6. John H. Hick, Philosophy of Religion (New Delhi: Prentice Hall of India, 2001), pp. 112 ff.
7. See Saral Jhingran, op. cit., pp. 208 ff.
8. See Bipan Chandra, Communalism in Modern India (New Delhi: Vikas Publishing House, 1989), pp. 34 ff., 78 ff.; also see Jhingran, op. cit., pp. 279-80.
9. See Saral Jhingran, Ethical Relativism and Universalism (Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass, 2005), pp. 44 ff. for a brief but comprehensive view of post-modern relativism.
10. "He, O, Arjuna, who sees with equality everybody in the image of his own self (atmopamyena sarvatra) whether in pleasure or in pain, is considered a perfect yogi." Bhagvadgita VI. 32, Tr. S. Radhakrishnan (Bombay: Blacki & Sons, 1977)
11. Yoga Sutra enumerates four desirable positive virtues--"Maitri (friendliness towards all); karuna ( mercy towards the suffering); mudita (gladness at the good of others); and upeksha (indifference towards evil persons, or towards one's own ill treatment). Yoga Sutra II. 33. (trans Swami Vivekanada,, Advaita Ashram, Calcutta )

    Long lists of universal virtues (dharma) are found in all Dharma shastras extolling above all ahimsa, then forgiveness (kshama), kindness (daya) and so on , but without any systematic discussion. See Manu Smriti VI. 92; X. 63; Gautama Dharma Sutra VII. 22-24. After extolling above virtues Gautama adds that performance of ritualistic dharma is of no avail if it is not accompanied by practice of universal virtues (dharma) ( Sacred Books of the East,, ed. by Max Muller, Motilal Banarsidass, Delhi, Vols. 25 & 11. )

12. Bhagavat Gita VI.. 32.; also see ibid., VI. 29-31. ( trans., S. Radhakrishnan, Blackie & Sons, (India) ltd. Bombay, New Delhi etc., 1977)
13. The Bijak of Kabir, Trs., Linda Hess and Sukhdev Singh (Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass, 1968), pp. 77; 81, 83, etc.
14. "The Maker made them all ... Who is a Brahmin; who is a Shudra? Don't get lost in false pride. False is the Hindu; false is the Turk." ibid. p. 81, also pp. 67., 88. The verses referred to above are found in the original Hindi version of Kabir's poems-Kabir Granthavali, ed. by Shyam Sundardas. 1 am not giving its details here.
15. "The Hindu says Ram is the beloved; The Turk says Rahim. Then they kill each other.... They are all deluded." ibid., pp. 42-43. Also see ibid. pp. 46, 64 etc. for his strong condemnation of killing animals for either sacrifice, or eating.
16. "Numskull, you have missed the point. It is all one skin and bone, one piss and shit. One blood, one meat. Who is a Hindu? Who is a Turk?" ibid., p.67.
17. For a detailed discussion of positive implications of the Buddhist doctrine of no-soul, see Hardayal, Bodhisattve Doctrine in Buddhist Sanskrit Literature (Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass, 1978), pp. 72 ff.
18. Matthew 22:37-40.
19. Bernard Gert, op. cit., pp. 73-74 etc.; cf. S.E. Toulmin, An Examination of the Place of Reason in Ethics (Cambridge: Cambidge University Press,1970), pp. 132, 142-3.
20. Hume, "Treatise of Human Nature," as given in Approaches to Ethics, op. cit., pp. 259 ff.
21. Kant, Fundamental Principles of the Metaphysics of Morality, tr. by Thomas K. Abbott (Indianapolis: The Library of Liberal Arts), pp. 45-46. cf. The Doctrine of Virtue, part II. of The Metaphysics of Morals, tr. by Mary O. Gregor, pp. 99, 132.
22. Doctrine of Virtue, op. cit., pp. 61, 115 ff., 119 ff., 120-122.
23. ibid., pp. 121.
24. Though the Mahabharata is the story of the great war which displayed cruel violence, still its author seems to feel the urge to extol non­violence and equal consideration for all living beings as the true values which are extolled almost everywhere in the main text. Here the Epic does not refer to any religious beliefs but just says, "Don't treat others in a way that you would not like to be treated yourself/ 'How can a man who wants to live himself kill another? Therefore, you should wish for others whatever you want for yourselves..." Shanti Parva 117: 18 ff., 251: 19-21, etc.
25. Sidgwick, Methods of Ethics, (7th edition), as given in Approaches to Ethics, op. cit., pp. 90 ff. 94 ff., 108 ff.
26. Hare, Freedom and Reason, 1963, 90 ff., 108 ff.
27. ibid., 108 ff., 113 ff.
28. ibid., pp. 118-119.
29. Sidgwick, op. cit., pp. 396-97.
30. op. cit., p. 394.
31. Stace, The Concept of Morals, 1961, pp. 82 ff.
32. M. K. Gandhi, Young India, June 12, 1924, given in Gandhi Reader for 1988, p. 24.
33. ibid, pp. 27.
34. John Rawls, A Theory of Justice (Oxford: Oxford University Press,1999), pp 83 and ff.; 302-3

Source: 'Gandhi Marg', Volume 38, Number 3 & 4, Combined issue Oct.-Dec. 2016 & Jan.-March 2017.

SARAL JHINGRAN did her Ph.D froom Delhi University in 1972 on the topic A Critical Reconstructotiof Advaita Vedanta with Special Reference to the Problem of Action. She was affiliated first to Rajasthan University, Jaipur, and then to Nehru Memorial Museum and Library, New Delhi. E-mail: saraljhingran@gmail.com