Trusteeship through the magnifying glass of Friendship

- Dr. Rajkumar Modak*

Abstract

Though the origin of hermeneutics was laid in Greek antiquity, it was accepted as the advanced formulation of methods of the interpretation when the biblical doctrines were interpreted by the Church’s authority for reformation. Thus, hermeneutics, initially, was a branch of theology that dealt, specifically, with the interpretation of holy scriptures. But after Hans-Georg Gadamer, a leading Continental philosopher of the twentieth century hermeneutics became popular for the interpretation of texts, legal documents, verbal (speech) expressions as well as non-verbal (conduct) expressions and thereby emerged as the philosophy of interpretation in general. Remembering all these about the philosophy of interpretation, whether there is a direct relationship between Aristotle’s notion of friendship and Gandhian notion of trusteeship, it is not known; because Aristotle was a philosopher of 300 BCE, whereas Gandhiji was a great modern Indian thinker of twentieth century. But an indirect relationship what Aristotle talked about friendship and what Gandhiji thought about trusteeship can be assumed through the philosophy of interpretation i.e., the application of hermeneutics method and this is the aim of this paper.

Before delving the Aristotelian notion of friendship let us start with the notion of virtues as developed by Plato, because friendship as well as trusteeship both are relied upon the concept of virtues in some forms or others. Plato argued against the sophists when they proclaimed that pleasure was the one and only one virtue on the ground— ‘only perception is knowledge.’ As knowledge being grounded on which objectivity is real as well as infallible; Plato’s recommendation was pleasure can never be the marked of the virtue due to the lack of objectivity. He further said, what is good, must be good for all; but pleasure being a feeling rests upon the individual mind and devoid of any kind of objectivity and intrinsic value as well. Side by side, same object may be pleasant to one and unpleasant to other. Thus, Plato concluded pleasure was not a virtue. Again, virtue is not also a right action, because a right action may be grounded on wrong ground, as like as right opinion can never be called as knowledge, because right opinion may not be based on sufficient ground. So, for Plato, virtue is not just a right action but the combination of right action and its sufficient ground i.e., why the action is right on the basis of rational comprehension on true values¹. From this perspective, Plato, in his, Republic considered four cardinal virtues—wisdom, courage, self-control and justice². These four cardinal virtues seem to be equally important, though some philosophers later on, proposed to give equal status to wisdom and justice. Let us take an example to explain how these cardinal virtues are equally important. Suppose, the individual X thinks that it is illegitimate to be a single parent. In order to share his or her opinion, he or she must be aware of the conditions to be a single parent. This is the part of wisdom. But wisdom is not sufficient to implement what X has already thought, that is why X needs the courage to share his or her view about the illegitimacy to be a single parent with others. Again, in order to defend the view shared by X, he or she must rely upon self-control; because his or her arguments may not be proved as sufficient. He or she must be aware, how far he or she goes. Finally, X should evaluate his or her previous stages whether he or she will proceed further or not through the application of justice.

In this background of the notion of virtues, it is claimed, in order to form an Ideal state, fair justice is a necessary condition. Applicability of fair justice is possible, according to Plato, only when a state is comprised of common father, common mother and common sons; instead of unitary family. If a son or daughter does not know who are his or her parents, and a woman does not know who is her son or her husband, and a man does not know who is his son or his wife; then there would be no possibility of partiality and thereby the justice would have been applied as fair as it should be. This was the argument of Plato for the application of justice in its optimum level. Apparently, the argument seems to be the best argument. But Aristotle argued against Plato’s standpoint, from the perspective of bonding in society. A family is a solid bonding unit depending on blood relation. If there is no bonding in society, Aristotle said, some crimes such as suicide, homicide etc. would be increased day by day. If anyone knows who is his parents or relatives, from the perspective of respect and obedience, Aristotle further argued, he or she, in general, keeps abstain himself or herself from committing such type of crimes.

But a state is not just the composition of the members of only one family. It is true as said earlier that a family is tied up on the basis of the blood relationship, but a state is comprised of many families. In a family justice is prevailed on the basis of blood relationship. But when the state is comprised of different families, now, the significant question may be asked: what will be the bonding or the relationship among the different families through which an Ideal state is to be formed? In order to search for the answer of this question, Aristotle in his book, Nichomachean Ethics, relied upon the concept of friendship after taking a rational comprehensive approach on values. He said, ‘Again, it seems that friendship is the bond that holds states together, and that law givers are even more eager to secure it than justice.’³

For him, friendship does not mean to get pleasure or gift from each other, rather ‘a friend is one who wishes and does to another what is good or seems good for that other’s sake, or one who wishes his friend to exist and to live for (the friend’s) sake’ or, in other words, ‘one who lives with another and choses what he choses, or as one who sympathizes with the griefs and joys of his friend.’⁴

From the above-mentioned definition of friendship given by Aristotle, it is clear what does the term friendship mean? But now the points are: Why human being make the friendship? And how friendship will be helpful to form an Ideal state? Regarding the answer of the first question, Aristotle not only discovered human being as the fond of desire-what is lovable i.e., what is either good or pleasant or useful by excavating the nature of human being but also related this nature of man to the notion of friendship. According to him, an inanimate object is, however, may be useful and it is desired by the human beings, but it cannot be a friend, because friendship always depends on the reciprocation and it is akin to the mutual understanding. So, in order to be friend, at least two animate beings are necessary.

For the answer of the other question, Aristotle said that friendship which is based on usefulness is no doubt the reflection of some goods, but it is not all good. Usefulness-depended friendship is accidental, because after the end of the usefulness the relationship comes to an end. Similarly, the friendship relation depending on the pleasure is also a kind of accidental relationship, because pleasure is the mark of some goods not all good, side by side, a pleasure-depended friendship relationship comes to an end if it fails to bread pleasure. ‘But the perfect kind of friendship’ as Aristotle considered, ‘is that of good men who resemble one another in virtue. For they both alike wish well to one another as good men, and it is their essential character to be good men. And those who wish well to their friends for the friends’ sake are friends in the truest sense; for they have these sentiments towards each other as being what they are, and not in an accidental way: their friendship, therefore, lasts as long as their virtue, and that is a lasting thing.’⁵ In fact, for Aristotle, ‘If citizens be friend, they have no need of justice, but though they be just, they need friendship or love also; indeed, the completest relationship of justice sems to be the realization of friendship or love also.’⁶

Now, we may come to the Gandhian notion of trusteeship. In the introductory paragraph, it has been mentioned that whether there is a direct linkage between Aristotle’s notion of friendship and Gandhian notion of trusteeship, it is not known; because Aristotle was a philosopher of 300 BCE, whereas Gandhiji was a great modern Indian thinker of twentieth century. However, there may be an indirect relationship –Aristotelian notion of friendship and Gandhian idea of trusteeship.

Gandhiji adhered the doctrine of Trusteeship in order to bring the economic equality or the abolishment of eternal conflict between capital and labour among the poor and the rich, after the establishment of nonviolent independent. He said, ‘A nonviolent system of government is clearly an impossibility so-long as the wide gulf between the rich and the hungry millions persists.’⁷ The gulf between the rich and the hungry millions can be bridged over either through the way of violence i.e., revolution as thought by Karl Marx or through the path of nonviolence. As Gandhiji was the ardent follower of nonviolence he strongly believed in trusteeship, otherwise, he said, ‘A violent and bloody revolution is a certainty one-day unless there is a voluntary abdication of riches and power that riches give and sharing them for the common good.’⁸ Trusteeship, for Gandhiji, is the relationship between the labours and the capitalists. Gandhiji, like Karl Marx, used to believe in the dignity of labour. For him, labour was superior to the capital. But Gandhiji differed from Marx as he never supposed to overthrow the capitalists through class struggle as he believed only on the way of Ahimsa or Love. In fact, Marx had the strong conviction on the united force of the proletariat⁹ and he thought struggle, struggle and the struggle was the last word to bring the human emancipation i.e., the establishment of classless society through a fight between proletariat and the capitalist.

But Gandhiji never ever preferred any kind of force to bring the human emancipation through revolution. He had always strong faith on the superiority of the human being. Through the excavation of human nature, he concluded that human being whether he is in the form of poor labour or he is in the form of rich capitalist, he is the God like.¹⁰ It is the way of Ahimsa or the Love through which the inner aspect of human being will be changed. ‘If that element is aroused and if the capitalists are also won over by love, they would be persuaded to believe that the wealth in their possession should be utilized for the good of the poor,’¹¹ Unless and until the inner aspect of human being is changed no Ideal state could be formed. He further believed that the labours deposit their wealth to the hand of the capitalists on the basis of firm trust. In fact, the function of the capitalists would just like the trustees for the poor. Through the exploration of the virtues with the help of the Love the inner vision of the capitalists must be changed. In one day, the capitalists would realize that the wealth which is now in their possessions are not really their own, it is for all including the labours. From that day, real human emancipation would be realized.

From the discussion mentioned above, it is clear that Gandhiji brought a new dimension of human emancipation which is materialistic in nature as well as it is free from any type of the application of force and thereby depending on absolute friendship or love as proposed by Aristotle. Here, it has been observed that there is a close affinity to the view of friendship in respect of trusteeship. But Gandhiji transcendent the notion of friendship, as for him, it is not the only condition to make an Ideal state. In fact, Gandhian notion of trusteeship is based on the sense of morality, love, and most, significantly, on non-possession. The inner change of any person whether he is a rich or poor is possible if and only if someone gets an ‘inner call’ of — ‘what the voice within tells you’, through the enlightenment based on the path of truth, Brahmacharya (purity), non-violence, poverty and non-possession.

However, one may criticise Gandhiji by saying that Gandhiji presupposed the honesty of rich people. But this type of criticism is not so important as Gandhiji from the beginning kept his firm conviction on human beings and he said, men are men because they are good. Here also the Aristotelian notion has been reflected as, for Aristotle, absolute friendship is possible among the good men only.

In conclusion, it may be said that the Gandhian concept of trusteeship is ideal, but there must be a gap between what is ideal and what is actual. However, this gap actually, acts as the main force for the human being in order to achieve Wellbeing from its Being.

References:

1. True virtue is thus right action proceeding from a rational comprehension of true values. From A Critical History of Greek Philosophy by W.T. Stace, Macmillan Co. Ltd., London, 1960, P-219
2. Plato (in the Republic) takes the four cardinal virtues recognized in his days—wisdom, courage, self-control and justice…From Aristotle, David Ross, University Paperbacks, London, 1923, P-202
3. Aristotle: Nicomachean Ethics Translated by F.H. Peters, Kegan Paul, London, 1893, P-252
4. Ibid. P-294
5. Ibid. P-257
6. Ibid.-252
7. Gandhi, M.K: Constructive Programme: Its Meaning and Place, Gandhiji Constructive Programme.pdf, 1945, P-14
8. Ibid. P-14
9. The supremacy of the proletariat will cause them to vanish still faster. United action, of the leading civilised countries at least, is one of the first conditions for the emancipation of the proletariat. Manifesto of the Communist Party by Karl Marx and Frederick Engels, Communist Manifesto.pdf, February 1848, P-26
10. Gandhiji believes that even the rich people—the so-called capitalists—are after all human beings, and as such they also have in them an element of essential goodness that man necessary possesses. From Contemporary Indian Philosophy by Basant Kumar Lal, Motilal Banarasidass, Delhi, 1992, P-143
11. Lal, Basant Kumar: Contemporary Indian Philosophy, Motilal Banarasidass, Delhi, 1992, pp.143-144

*Dr. Rajkumar Modak, is a Professor of Philosophy in Sidho-Kanho-Birsha University, Purulia, West Bengal. Email: skbuphilosophy@gmail.com.
Published on 01.12.2021