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Reader: This is a new doctrine, that what
is gained through fear is retained only while the fear lasts.
Surely, what is given will not be withdrawn?
Editor: Not so. The Proclamation of I857 was given at the end of a
revolt, and for the purpose of preserving peace. When peace was secured and
people became simple minded its full effect was toned down. If I cease stealing
for fear of punishment, I would recommence the operation as soon as the fear is
withdrawn from me. This is almost a universal experience. We have assumed that
we can get men to do things by force and, therefore, we use force.
Reader: Will you not admit that you are arguing against
yourself? You know that what the English obtained in their own country they
obtained by using brute force. I know you have argued that what they have
obtained is useless, but that does not affect my argument. They wanted useless
things and they got them. My point is that their desire was fulfilled. What does
it mean, what means they adopted? Why should we not obtain our goal, which is
good, by any means whatsoever even by using violence? Shall I think of the means
when I have to deal with a thief in the house? My duty is to drive him out
anyhow. You seem to admit that we have received nothing, and that we shall
receive nothing by petitioning. Why, then, may we not do so by using brute
force? And, to retain what we ay receive we shall keep up the fear by using the
same force to the extent that it may be necessary. You will not find fault with
a continuance of force to prevent a child from thrusting its foot into fire.
Somehow or other we have to gain our end.
Editor: Your reasoning is Plausible. It has deluded many. I have
used similar arguments before now. But I think I know better now, and I shall
endeavor to undeceive you. Let us first take the argument that we are justified
in gaining our end by using brute force because the English gained theirs by
using similar means. It is perfectly true that they used brute force and that it
is possible for us to do likewise, but by using similar means we can get only
the same thing that they got. You will admit that we do not want that. Your
belief that there is no connection between the means and the end is a great
mistake. Through that mistake even men who have been considered religious have
committed grievous crimes. Your reasoning is the same as saying that we can get
a rose through planting a noxious weed. If I want to cross the ocean, I can do
so only by means of a vessel: if I were to use a cart for that purpose, both the
cart and I would soon find the bottom. "As is the God, so is the votary", is a
maxim worth considering. Its meaning has been distorted and men have gone
astray. The means may be likened to a seed, the end to a tree: and there is just
the same inviolable connection between the means and the end as there is between
the seed and the tree. I am not likely to obtain the result flowing from the
worship of God by laying myself prostrate before Satan. If, therefore, anyone
were to say: "I want to worship God; it does not matter that I do so by means of
Satan," it would be set down as ignorant folly. We reap exactly as we sow. The
English in I833 obtained greater voting power by violence. Did they by using
brute force better appreciate their duty? They wanted the right of voting, which
they obtained by using physical force. But real rights are a result of
performance of duty: these rights they have not obtained. We. therefore, have
before us in England the force of everybody wanting and insisting on his rights,
nobody thinking of his duty. And, where everybody wants rights, who shall give
them to whom ? I do not wish to imply that they do no duties. They don't perform
the duties corresponding to those rights; and as they do not perform that
particular duty, namely, acquire fitness, their rights have proved a burden to
them. In other words, what they have obtained is an exact result of the means
they adopted. They used the means corresponding to the end. If I want to deprive
you of your watch, I shall certainly have to fight for it; if l want to buy your
watch, I shall have to pay you for it; and if I want a gift, I shall have to
plead for it, and, according to the means I employ, the watch is stolen
property, my own property, or a donation. Thus we see three different results
from three different means. Will you still say that means do not matter?
Now we shall take the example given by you of the thief to be
driven out. I do not agree with you that the thief may be driven out by any
means. If it is my father who has come to steal I shall use one kind of means.
If it is an acquaintance I shall use another, and in the case of a perfect
stranger I shall use a third. If it is a white man, you will perhaps say you
will use means different from those you will adopt with an Indian thief. If it
is a weakling, the means will be different from those to be adopted for dealing
with an equal in physical strength, and if the thief is armed from top to toe, I
shall simply remain quiet. Thus we have a variety of means between the father
and the armed man. Again, I fancy that I should pretend to be sleeping whether
the thief was my father or that strong armed man. The reason for this is that my
father would also be armed and I should succumb to the strength possessed by
either and allow my things to be stolen. The strength of my father would make me
weep with pity; the strength of the armed man would rouse in me anger and we
should become enemies. Such is the curious situation. From these examples we may
not be able to agree as to the means to be adopted in each case. I myself seem
clearly to see what should be done in all these cases, but the remedy may
frighten you. I therefore hesitate to place it before you. For the time being I
will leave you to guess it, and if you cannot, it is clear you will have to
adopt different means in each case. You will also have seen that any means will
not avail to drive away the thief. You will have to adopt means to fit each
case. Hence it follows that your duty is not to drive away the thief by any
means you like.
Let us proceed a little further. That
well-armed man has stolen your property; you have harbored the thought of his
act, you are filled with anger; you argue that you want to punish that rogue,
not for your own sake, but for the good of your neighbors; you have collected a
number of armed men, you want to take his house by assault; he is duly informed
of it, he runs away, he too is incensed. He collects his brother robbers, and
sends you a defiant message that he will commit robbery in broad daylight. You
are strong, you do not fear him, you are prepared to receive him. Meanwhile the
robber pesters your neighbors. They complain before you. You reply that you are
doing all for their sake, you do not mind that your own goods have been stolen.
Your neighbors reply that the robber never pestered them before, and that he
commenced his depredations only after you declared hostilities against him. You
are between Scylla and Charybdis. You are full of pity for the poor men. What
they say is true. What are you to do? You will be disgraced if you now leave the
robber alone. You, therefore, tell the poor men: "Never mind. Come, my wealth is
yours, I will give you arms, I will teach you how to use them; you should
belabor the rogue; don't you leave him alone." And so the battle grows; the
robbers increase in numbers; your neighbors have deliberately put themselves to
inconvenience. Thus the result of wanting to take revenge upon the robber is
that you have disturbed your own peace, you are in perpetual fear of being
robbed and assaulted, your courage has given place to cowardice. If you will
patiently examine the argument, you will see that I have not overdrawn the
picture. This is one of the means. Now let us examine the other. You set this
armed robber down as an ignorant brother; you intend to reason with him at a
suitable opportunity: you argue that he is, after all, a fellow-man; you do not
know what prompted him to steal. You, therefore. decide that, when you can, you
will destroy the man's motive for stealing. Whilst you are thus reasoning with
yourself, the man comes again to steal. Instead of being angry with him you take
pity on him. You think that this stealing habit must be a disease with him.
Henceforth, you, therefore, keep your doors and windows open. you change your
sleeping place, and you keep your things in a manner most accessible to him. The
robber comes again and is confused as all this is new to him; nevertheless he
takes away your things. But his mind is agitated. He inquires about you in the
village, he comes to learn about your broad and loving heart, he, repents, he
begs your pardon, returns you your things, and leaves off the stealing habit. He
becomes your servant, and you find for him honorable employment. This is the
second method. Thus, you see, different means have brought about totally
different results. I do not wish to deduce from this that robbers will act in
the above manner or that all will have the same pity and love like you. But I
only wish to show that fair means alone can produce fair results, and that, at
least in the majority of cases, if not indeed in all, the force of love and pity
is infinitely greater than the force of arms. There is harm in the exercise of
brute force, never in that of pity.
Now we will take the question of petitioning. It is a
fact beyond dispute that a petition, without the backing of force is useless.
However, the late Justice Ranade used to say that petitions served a useful
purpose because they were a means of educating people. They give the latter an
idea of their condition and warn the rulers. From this point of view, they are
not altogether useless. A petition of an equal is a sign of courtesy, a petition
from a slave is a symbol of his slavery. A petition backed by force is a
petition from an equal and, when he transmits his demand in the form of a
petition, it testifies to his nobility. Two kinds of force can back petitions.
"We shall hurt you if you do not give this is one kind of force., it is the
force of arms, whose evil results we have already examined. The second kind of
force can thus be stated: "If you do not concede our demand, we shall be no
longer your petitioners. You can govern us only so long as we remain the
governed; we shall no longer have any dealings with you." The force. implied in
this may be described as love-force, soul-force, or, more popularly but less
accurately, passive resistance. This force is indestructible. He who uses it
perfectly understands his position. We have an ancient proverb which literally
means: "One negative cures thirty-six diseases." The force of arms is powerless
when matched against the force of love or the soul.
Now we shall take your last illustration, that of the
child thrusting its foot into fire. It will not avail you. What do you really do
to the child? Supposing that it can exert so much physical force that it renders
you powerless and rushes into fire, then you cannot prevent it. There are only
two remedies open to you either you must kill it in order to prevent it from
perishing in the flames, or you must give your own life because you do not wish
to see it perish before your very eyes. You will not kill it. If your heart is
not quite full of pity. It is possible that you will not surrender yourself by
preceding the child and going into the fire yourself. You, therefore. helplessly
allow it to go into the flames. Thus, at any rate. you are not using physical
force. I hope you will not consider that it is still physical force, though of a
low order, when you would forcibly prevent the child from rushing towards the
fire if you could. That force is of a different order and we have to understand
what it is.
Remember that, in thus preventing the child, you are
minding entirely its own interest, you are exercising authority for its
sole benefit. Your example does not apply to the English. In using brute
force against the English you consult entirely your own, that is the
national, interest. There is no question here either of pity or of love.
If you say that the actions of the English, being evil, represent fire.
and that they proceed to their actions through ignorance, and that
therefore they occupy the position of a child and that you want to
protect such a child, then you will have to overtake every evil action
of that kind by whomsoever committed and, as in the case of the evil
child, you will have to sacrifice yourself. If you are capable of such
immeasurable pity, I wish you well in its exercise.
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